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MAY 9, 1950: A gnutND-IlIE-SCENE ACCOUI{I 0F WHAT HAPPEMD
by !?anqois Fontaine
Mr. Fontaine is head of the European Communitiesl
press and information office in Paris. At the
time the Schuman PLan was taking shape, he was
chef de cabinet to Jean Monnet. Mr. Fontaine
tells, for the first time, the inside story of
political circumstances and events in France
Leading up to the Schuman PLan Declaration 20 years ago.
Never had conditions in Europe looked more confused, never had
the Continent been nearer the explosion point than it ruas on the
morning of l,Iay 9, 1950, despite the constant efforts of dedicated men
who had been appealing for unity since the end of the last war. The
morning newspapers were ful-L of specuLation about how the French Minister
for Foreign Affairs, Robert Schuman, would respond to his British and
American coll-eagues, Ernest Bevin and Dean Acheson, who awaited him the
next day in London for important decisions about West Germany.
France was almost resigned to the removal of the Last vestige of
tripartite occupation controL. Allied control over the Ruhr could no
Longer be justified, nor couLd the ceiLtng placed on coal and steeL
production in a country that was recovering rapidly. The probl-em of
C,ermanyrs entry into the Western defense system rrTas uppermost. IIow
would the Russians respond to the relaxation of ALLied controL? The
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French Government was ready to propose a High AtLanEic CounciL, the
ItBidault Plan,rr in which Germany r"ouLd have no role. The more the
obsession with the German presence grew, the harder everyone tried to
ignore it.
However, the head of this reconstituted state, an exceptional man,
saw the dangers of power and isol-ation. Chancellor Konrad Adenauer did
not vrant to take advantage of every chance that arose for the nationalistic
rebirth of his country. He himseLf proposed l-imits on the sovereignty that
would be restored to Germany. In an interview two months earLier, he had
spoken of a ful-L union between France and Germanyr a union open to other
countries. But he spoke for a defeated nation that had no voice in inter-
national councils. The news took up only a few l-ines in the newspapers.
However, General Charles de Gaul1e echoed his words: "If we didnrt force
ourseLves to Look at the facts cooIly, we wouLd be aLmost bLinded by the
prospects of what the French and the Germans could accomplish together...t'
But Franee had to make that effort. Everyone knew that no initiative could
come from the vanquished.
As for the conquerors, they were embarrassed by their responsibiLities.
France had to take the first step, according to the rnandate given to her
by her Allies. Bernard Clappier, Schumanrs chef de cabinet at that time,
telIs that during a meeting of the three Western Powers in the United
States at the end of L949, Acheson stated: ttWe are absolutely in agreement
on entrusting our French colleague with the task of definlng our conrmon
policy toward Germany. tt That was the day Schuman understood that he would
not escape his destiny: erasing the frontier whose absurdity he more than
any one else had k.r.orr,.l
Schuman would seek a solution. Though he spoke the same Language as the
Chancellor and shared the same high ideals, he couLd not easily cast aside
the rights of the conqueror. Particularly on the probLem of the Saar, the
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French nationalists were watching him. Little
that he would have to rnake a radical departure
littLe he came to believe
get anywhere.
Jean Monnet Steps In
At the same time, another Frenchman had also come to the same conclusion.
Jean Monnet, creator of Francers post-war modernization pIan, had watched
the rapid transformation of the world baLance of power, the heatitrg up
of the cold war, the swift recovery of C,ermany, ih" American decision to
use this recovery for the benefit of the West, and the French reluctance
to oppose it. To Monnet it appeared that Europe was reviving every past
error.
He was in a better position than anyone else to gauge the economic
consequences of this disequillbrium. He saw a return to national rivaL-
ries that would Lead to protectionism and internationaL cartels: France
would crawl into a shell-; and, in the face of Europers siLence, the
United States by itself would organise Western defenses against the USSR.
Thus, his fears were not limited to econornlc activity. He did not think
only in terms of organizing production-related areas as did many of the
European pioneers who sought international control over the French and
German coal and steeL economies. Like Robert Schuman, he wanted to change
C;ermany's image in Europers consciousness once and for al-l. Like Adenauer,
he thougLa the time had corne to help fix the destiny of an unstabl-e peopLe
who shifted dangerousLy between feelings of national superiority and
inferiority 
"
The paroxysm of anxiety reached in the spring of l-950 and the con-
vergence of the thoughts of two rnen who barely knew each other would Later
seem extraordinary. Schuman had had LittLe contact with Monnet. Moreoever,
Monnet did not approach the Minister for Foreign Affairs when he decided to
act. Instead, he sent Premier Georges Bidatrlt a letter proposing
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rfconcrete and resolute action, in a limited but decisive area.trThere
lras to be a tbasic change".in French relations with Germany rrby creating
a common base for economic conditlons and new European rules and insti-
tutions accepted.by the sovereign natlons.t'2 It was to be the Coal and
Steel- Community with Europe's first supranational institutions. But
Btdault did not consider this proposaL important. Monnet became irnpatient
as the cl-ouds gathered over Europe. On Friday, April 28, he saw Clappier
and gave him the same message for Schuman. That very night, Schuman thought
about this message in the sol-itude of Scy-Chazel-Les. Monday morning, getting
off the train at the C,are de l-rEst, he said to his colleague: "The answer
is yes. I wiLl take care of it.rr Events wouLd unfold swiftly.
The ilConspiracvrt
It is Monday, May 1. Before the London conference on May 10, a revolution-
ary economic and poLiticaL proposaI must be put into shape, adopted, and
pubLished by the French @vernment, and Europets answer received -- with
aLL preparations in absolute secrecy.
Quite rightLy the Schuman Plan has been caLLed a consptracy. Had it
been pubJ-icly debated, conservative forces woul-d have tbrn it to pieces.
The dlplomats wouLd have rlnegotiated. tr There had been more than enough
talk of improvising. Another criticism,rested on a more solid base:
that fusing trtro huge systems of production, eliminating economic frontiers
and ancient protectionist practices, would need months of consultat,lons
and technical study. However, the case had to be settl-ed in a week, with-
out experts. On this point, Monnet and Schuman had the same ideas and
the same ctear conscience: experts wouLd come l-ater. It was an essentially
poLitical proposaL.
For fear of arousing suspicton, Ibnnet and Schurnan communicate through
an int,ermediary, Clappier. ldonnet shuts himself up with his two aides,
Etienne Hirsch and Pierre Uri. They are joined by legaL expert Paul Reuter,
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inventor of the lligh Authority3 and the originator of Europers first
federal institutions. Each night the day's notes are burned. Onl-y
two ministers know about the work: Ren6 Mayer and Ren6 P16ven.
rrEurope WiLL Not Be Made ALI- at Once'r
The mornlng of May 9 the text of the declaration is taken to Schuman
as he enters the Council of Ministers rneeting. It was said that instead
of reading the text to his col-Leagues he "recountedil it, which is in keep-
ing with the style of this man who couLd seern sincere whtle being deliber-
ateLy vague when interests of State requiied it. Mearnvhile, in Bonn a
handlrritten Letter was being put into the ChanceLlorrs hands. Adenauer,
surprised and moved, innrediately answered: ItI approve wholeheartedly.rt
In Paris, the Council meeting dragged on, but it had already turned
to other topices. Schuman had irranediateLy received the Councilrs carte
blanche for the London conference, without revealing his intentions of
tel.Ling the public of his plan that very night in ?aris.
In a few hours a vast operation had been readied. The press corps
was asked to come to the Quai drorsay at four that afternoon for a message
of prime importance. The ambassadors were to meet with the Minister one
hour earlier. Those present that afternoon recal-L the constant stream
of visitors to Schumanrs office. On l-eaving, each was intercepted by
Monnet who toLd them: "You know lt is not a joke. Read the paper care-
fully. It is going to happen. Believe me, there is no other way out.'l
At the Last moment, Schuman wrote by hand the beautiful preamble:
ttlt is no longer a question of empty words, but rather of a boLd act,
a constructive act. France has acted and the results of her actions can
be irmnense. We hope they wlIL be.rl
Only a few men couLd gauge the meaning of these phrases. t,I,lo more
empty words...tt Yes, thought the intrigued listeners, thatrs what they
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always say, but wefll still be talking about it, in vain, for a long time
to come. tA bold act...rtt thatts a fancy phrase for just another proposal
for the Ruhr problem. ttFrance has acted...r" perhaps, but whether or not
the other nations foll-ow her remains to be seen. There was some sceptlclsm
in the Salon de lrHorl-oge as Schuman read the declaration in his monotonous,
sofEvoice. tE.rrope will not be made all at once, or according to a single,
generaL plan. It will be built through concrete achievements, which first
create de facto solidarit]...t|
Those words contained the terms of an enpirical method meant to
reassure and even mislead certain people. The prospect of pooling coal
and steel resources disturbed only the steelmen who declared war at that
very second. But for the public, the pLan conformed closely to ideas of
the moment. A note drafted at the last minute by Pierre Uri was simul-
taneousLy distributed to Journalists so that it wouLd be clearly under-
stood that the High Authorlty would be compLetely different from a carteL.
This could only be to the good for the French, haunted by the reemergence
of the German steel cartels.
Tt]g Reaction 
,
To convince political cornmentators to treat the pLan in a way that would
capture the public imagination at that time of disenchantment, it had to
be played up. A note from Agence France Presse stressed the importance
of the event. t'It ls, a political gesture of exceptional importance --
some peopl-e go so far as to call lt trevolutionary'."
The transformation of economic sectors that had provided the means
for two wars into an instrument of peace was emphasized. However, most
people scarceLy saw beyond the settlement of the Franco-C,erman dispute.
'Europe" was not yet clearLy seen. Idonetheless, the key word had been
uttered, the word that has given validity to every political development
in the Comnuntty for the past twenty years: f'This proposal wiLL build
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the first concrete foundatlon of the European Federation which ls
lndlspensible to the preservation of peace.'r
In 1950, the word "peacett was stronger and better understood than
the expresslon ttEuropean Federation. " It was a chance for peace that
the French and all Europe welcomed that night.
The news dispatches announced the agreement of the German, Italian,
Be1glan, Luxembourg, and Dutch Governments. In retrospect, the feeling
remains that this lras I well-mounted operation. Now it seems astonish-
ing that the Conrnunity of Six, which has stood the test of time, simply
fe1l into place in a matter of hours, without any Lengthy deliberations by
kings, queens, and presidents; but this is what actually happened. Sover-
elgnty, Like privilege, either abdicates in an instant with one generous
surge of feeling, or not at aLl.
After all, no one had yet spoken of the Six when Schuman concluded:
'rCentlemen, France is making a proposal, with no idea of how it will trrn
out. It is up to Europe to answer...'l
ttls Russia a part of Europe?r' someone irmnediately asked.
t'Of cours€... "
trThen itrs a Leap lnto the unknown?"
ItThatrs right, a Leap into the unknor^rnr" said the French Minister.
t'I thank you, gentlemen. It
In a 1itt1e while.he would Leave for Iondon to meet with Bevin and
Acheson. ?erhaps the Bnglish read the text more carefulLy or understood
the meaning of the French proposal Less fully, for the British declined
membership. In any case, the London conference took pIace, but the ori-
ginal agenda was thrown out. May 10 dawned over a healing Continent once
again imbued with hope.
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FOOTNOTES
1
- The son of a farmer from the Lorraine, sehuman was born German but
became French when the Treaty of Versailles restored the province to
France.
2 rni" introductory note (nine pages l-ong in the finaL version of
May 4, L950), is still a secret historical document. It may be
published on the May 9 anniversary.
3 th" 8-man Executive of the Coal and Steel Community.
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